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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

LAYTON CITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Docket No- 860493

vs.
BILLY E. NOON,

Category No. 2
Defendant, Appellant,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether at the close of the City's evidence, the Trial Court
properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
probably cause to effect an arrest, and whether the District
Court properly upheld said ruling.
Whether defendant's counsel effectively and adequately
represented the defendant, thus affording defendant a fair trial,
and whether the District Court's ruling stating so, was proper.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case involving a single charge, that
being the traffic offense of driving while under the influence of
alcohol, a class B misdemeanor.
The violation and the arrest occurred on November 30, 1985
within Layton City.

The matter was set for a jury trial in the

Fourth Circuit Court, Layton Department of the Davis County
District Court, before the Honorable Judge K. Roger Bean.

The

jury trial was held March 4, 1986 and at the conclusion thereof

the jury returned a verdict of guilty and the judge entered a
conviction pursuant thereto.
On April 23, 1986 defendant's motion for arrest of judgment
and order of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial was
heard before Judge Bean.

After hearing argument and reviewing

the file said motion was denied.
Thereafter, defendant appealed to the Second District Court.
Briefs were filed and oral arguments presented to the Honorable
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby.

The District Court upheld the verdict

of the Circuit Court and announced that ruling July 25, 1986.
Defendant now makes this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the late evening hours of November 30, 1985, the
defendant drove into the parking lot of the Circle K store just
west of the corner of Antelope Drive and Main Street, Layton
City, Utah.

(Tr. 22). The defendant drove the vehicle into the

parking lot in such a manner that the Circle K employee's
attention was immediately drawn to the vehicle as its lights
flashed vertically as the vehicle crossed the driveway approach.
(Tr. 3^). Defendant then entered in the parking lot and
continued at such a rate of speed that the same employee thought
the vehicle would come right into the store.

The employee, Matt

Wilhelm, did not know how, but somehow defendant was able to get
the vehicle stopped.

(Tr. 22). There were no customers in the

store and no other vehicles in the parking lot and Mr. Wilhelm's
eyes were "fixed" on the defendant's car.

(Tr. 24). Defendant

was the sole occupant of the vehicle,

(Tr. 23, 148).

As the defendant entered the store, Mr. Wilhelm immediately
began to make observations concerning the manner in which the
defendant conducted himself.

(Tr. 25). The defendant was

walking awkwardly, his speech was slurred, he could not control
his cup of coffee and there was an odor of alcohol.

(Tr. 25, 26).

The defendant could hardly walk, and he was stumbling.

(Tr. 27,

38, 46).
Mr. Wilhelm, having no doubt in his mind who was driving the
vehicle (Tr. 44), and having observed defendant's condition,
became concerned about the potential results of that combination
and notified the police.

(Tr. 26).

While waiting for the police to arrive, Mr. Wilhelm
continued to attempt conversing with defendant in order to delay
him so he would not "drive off."

(Tr. 28). Shortly thereafter,

the officers arrived and directly went up to Mr. Wilhelm to
obtain his information concerning the events leading up to his
notifying the police.

Before approaching defendant, they made

sure that Mr. Wilhelm had seen defendant driving, that the
witness could have seen what he claims he saw and that it was the
same individual that was still in the store.

(Tr. 28, 55-57,

74-77, 90, 92). After being satisfied that Mr. Wilhelm was quite
positive (Tr. 57), the officers approached and began making their
own observations.

(Tr. 44, 58-60, 63-66, 78-80, 93-96, 105-108,

118-127, 156).
Based on those observations, their training and experience,
the defendant's characteristics, the presence of one car and one

customer and the corroborating information of Mr. Wilhelm, the
defendant was placed under arrest for driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol.

(Tr. 63, 67, 140).

Defendant was then transported to the Layton Police
Department and was requested to submit to a chemical test of a
breath sample.
test.

(Tr. 68). Defendant refused to submit to the

(Tr. 69, 70, 84, 85, 98, 99).
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable Judge K.

Roger Bean on March 4, 1986, and at the conclusion thereof, the
defendant was adjudged guilty of driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, and a conviction was entered
accordingly.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
As set forth in both state statute and case law pursuant to
said statute, the officers had probable cause to arrest the
defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol.

Although

the officers did not see the defendant drive, they had contact
with the defendant a very short time after the driving had
occurred and noticed his extremely intoxicated state.

Further,

prior to their contact with defendant they spoke with a witness
who positively placed defendant as the driver of the vehicle.
Defendant's arrest was based on probable cause.
Defendant's trial counsel more than satisfied the minimal
performance requirements.

It is obvious from the record that he

was familiar with these type of trials. Defendant has failed to

establish that trial counselfs performance was ineffective or
that the results would have been different.

ARGUMENT
PROPOSITION I
THE TRIAL AND DISTRICT COURTS CORRECTLY RULED THAT
THE POLICE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLY CAUSE TO ARREST
DEFENDANT.
Defendant's initial assignment of error is that both lower
courts erred in ruling that there was probably cause to arrest
the defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol-

The

lower court's rulings are correct as they are founded on state
law and this Court's interpretations of said laws.
State statute specifically provides the standard an officer
may use in effectuating an arrest for a violation of the "driving
under the influence" statute.

This standard, set forth in

§41-6-44(8), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), and provides
that:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest
a person for violation of this section when the
the officer has probable cause to believe the
violation has occurred, although not in his
presence, and if the officer has probable cause
to believe that the violation was committed by
the person.
Admittedly, the officers did not observe the defendant
driving a motor vehicle.

That is not fatal to this case, in

fact, such a situation was contemplated by the drafters of this
statute as is indicated by the phrase "although not in his
presence . . . ."

The Utah State Supreme Court has construed

this statute and applied it to facts not unlike those in the case
at bar.

In State v. Bryan, Utah, 395 P.2d 539 (1964), the

Defendant was involved in an automobile accident.

The officers

arrived at the scene shortly thereafter to find Defendant sitting

on the curb.

The officers did not see Bryan driving the vehicle

and the only offense committed in the officers' presence was
public intoxication.

Bryan, supra at 540.

situation in the case at bar.

That is precisely the

However, in Bryan, after the

Defendant was transported to the hospital the officers placed him
under arrest for driving while intoxicated.

The Court ruled that

the arrest was lawful regardless of the facts that the arrest was
delayed and that the offense did not take place in the officers'
presence.

Bryan, supra, at 540.

In the case at bar, the facts

available and known by the police officer provide even a stronger
foundation for arrest than that in Bryan, as herein the officers
had direct evidence that the defendant was driving.

(Tr.

22,23,44).
Defendant has at least conceded that the officer had
probable cause to arrest defendant for public intoxication.
(Defendant's Statement of Points and Authorities in support of
appeal to District Court, p.6). Thus, the scenario in Bryan was
nearly followed herein, but instead of delaying the arrest, the
officers herein had the necessary probable cause at the initial
scene.
Defendant claims that the City failed to account for
defendant's activities from the time he arrived at the store
until the officers arrived.

This, according to defendant, is

fatal to the case since a possible alternate explanation for
defendant's intoxicated state exists and that this renders the
conviction void as defendant "could have" consumed the alcohol at
the store.

First of all, a substantial amount of defendant's

activities in this short period of time were indeed accounted for.
Defendant entered the store and "attempted to buy a cup of
coffee."

(Tr. 25). As defendant testified, it was in a paper

cup (Tr. 148), presumably the same cup Officer Cline observed him
holding.

(Tr. 91). Also, during this period of time, the

defendant returned to his vehicle, turned off the lights and
tried to close the trunk (Tr. 25, 26), tried to explain to Mr.
Wilhelm the problem with the trunk (Tr. 26, 27), and was being
observed by Mr. Wilhelm and continued conversation was attempted.
(Tr. 27, 28).
In applying the "probable cause" standard to the case at
bar, it is clear that the standard was satisfied by the officers
at the time of arrest.

That standard, as articulated by the

Supreme Court in State v. Hatcher, Utah, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972), is
to be objective, as follows:
whether from the facts known to the officer,
and the inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in
his position would be justified in believing
that the suspect had committed the offense.
Hatcher, supra.
In applying that standard to this case, the facts known to
the officer were that the defendant was extremely intoxicated, in
a public place, was the only customer on the premises and there
was only one car in the parking lot.

The information received

from the eyewitness, Mr. Wilhelm, included that defendant was the
driver of that vehicle, was the sole occupant of that vehicle,
drove into the parking lot at an alarming speed and an admission
that it was defendants vehicle.

This latter type of information

is analogous to that given the officers in Hatcher, wherein
solely the information from a witness was used to locate and
arrest the Defendant therein without the officers having observed
anything first hand.
In the case at bar, the information given the officers by
Mr. Wilhelm was corroborated by existing physical evidence, i.e.,
one car, one customer and an individual so intoxicated that the
field sobriety tests were terminated for his own safety.
63, 95, 108, 1190).

(Tr.

Most assuredly, in using the standard

announced in Hatcher, supra, the facts known to the officers,
coupled with reasonably deducted inferences, a reasonable and
prudent person would be justified in believing that the defendant
committed the offense.

The officers did have probable cause to

arrest defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol
pursuant to §41-6-44(8), U.C.A. (1953, as amended).

This Court

should respond to defendant's contention just as it did to the
same argument in State v. Cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554, at 556
(1974).
PROPOSITION II
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL'S CONDUCT WAS COMMENDABLE
AND REFLECTED COMPETENCE.
Defendant's next assignment of error is that, due to alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant was denied a fair
trial.

In support therefor, defendant has cited five (5)

instances wherein, in the opinion of defendant, objections should
have been interposed.

Based on those five (5) instances and, in

defendant's contention, a weak evidentiary foundation for his

conviction, the results of the trial would have been different.
The first alleged error defendant claims counsel made was
failure to object to the prosecutor's leading questions of Mr.
Wilhelm.

It is obvious from the record that the majority of said

questions were preliminary in nature.

Further, the questions,

for the most part, did not suggest an answer that would not or
could not have been elicited otherwise.
Secondly, defendant claims that counsel's refraining from
objecting to Mr. Wilhelm's narrative was extremely prejudicial.
Mr. Wilhelm was testifying as to his state of mind and motivation
for notifying the police.

(Tr. 26). The objection would have

had to have been made during the witness1 response as opposed to
the conclusion of a question.

It may have been that counsel

did not object and request for the answer to be stricken as a
strategy to avoid actually reinforcing the statement in the
jurors' minds.

It should be noted that when the prosecutor

attempted to elicit an additional like response, defense counsel
did object and it was kept from the jury.

However, it should be

noted that the Court's ruling was not that the information was
not admissible but rather, it was repetitive.

Thus even if an

initial objection had been made it may have been overruled and
then that testimony would have been heard immediately after that
ruling and would have been more emphasized to the jury.
The third alleged error was counsel's refraining from
objecting to Officer Robnett's recitation of Mr. Wilhelm's
information to the officer.
objectionable hearsay.

Defendant asserts that this was

Such evidence could have been offered for

other reasons, such as to show what information the officers
received from Mr. Wilhelm as well as for corroboration of the
witnesses' testimonies.

The information contained in the

statements had already been established directly from Mr.
Wilhelm, rendering any alleged prejudice or harm negligible.
The fourth alleged error by defense counsel was the allowing
of Officer Robnett to read from a report without establishing
need for refreshing his memory.

Defense counsel most assuredly

knew that if such an objection was made, it would be merely a
procedural formality to establish a foundation and upon doing
that, the possibility of the entire report being admissible could
be an undesirable result for the defense.

(Rule 612, U.R.E.).

Fifth alleged error by defense counsel was allowing Officer
Robnett to testify concerning defendant's refusing to submit to
the intoxilyzer test.

Evidence concerning a refusal to submit to

such a chemical test is specifically allowed by statute.
§41-6-44.10(8) U.C.A. (1953 as amended).

Further, the officer

testified how he arrived at the opinion that defendant refused.
Such opinion testimony is admissible under both Rules 701 and 702
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
It is clear from the record that these alleged errors,
either singularly or cumulatively, had little, if any impact on
the outcome of the trial.

That defendant has only been able to

find five (5) alleged errors from a transcript of 190 pages is
indicative of defense counsel's performance.

As has been

established, appellate courts "do not second guess an attorney's
legitimate exercise of judgment, as to trial tactics or strategy."

11

Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983)9 citing State v.
McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203 (1976).
Further, when these alleged errors are viewed in relation to
the substantial evidence supporting the verdict, the
insignificance thereof is apparent.
This contention is without merit.

PROPOSITION III
THE JURY VERDICT BELOW IS WELL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The elements that the City was required to satisfy were that
1) on or about the 30th day of November, 1985, defendant drove a
vehicle;

2) that at that time, defendant was under the influence

of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely
driving a vehicle; and

3) that these acts took place within

Layton, Utah.
Direct evidence established that defendant was indeed
driving a vehicle.

(Tr. 22, 23, 44). This was subsequently

admitted to by defendant.

(Tr. 148). There was no dispute that

this all occurred within Layton City.

(Tr. 50). As for the

element of defendant's degree of impairment,Mr. Wilhelm and the
three officers independently concluded that defendant was
extremely intoxicated and the officers opined, based on their
training, experience and observations of defendant that he was
not capable of safely driving a vehicle.

(Tr. 65, 96, 120).

The only remaining element was to establish that defendant
was so intoxicated and impaired while driving the vehicle. Based
on the above referenced direct evidence and the manner in which

Mr. Wilhelm saw the vehicle approach the store and with the
proximity in time of defendant's driving and the observation of
his intoxicated state, clearly a reasonable inference that may be
drawn therefrom is that defendant was intoxicated while driving.
Making such reasonable inferences based on the direct evidence is
a proper function of the trier of fact, State v. Kazda, Utah, 392
P.2d 686 (1964); State v. Maestas, Utah, 652 P.2d 903 (1982).
The jurors so found.

PROPOSITION IV
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Initially, it is the defendant's burden to establish that
"the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime charged."

State v. Kerekes,

Utah 622 P.2d 1161 (1980), (citing State v. Daniels, Utah, 584
P.2d 880 (1978)).

This standard and language has been repeated

and reiterated on numerous occasions and is found again in State
v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984).

Defendant has failed to

satisfy this burden.
This Court's role in reviewing appeals from criminal
convictions has been well established.

In reviewing the

conviction, it is encumbent upon the appellate court to assume
that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence which
support the verdict.
(1979)*

State v. Smathers, Utah, 602 P.2d 708

Further, on appeal the evidence, including the

reasonable inferences which may be fairly drawn therefrom, will

be reviewed in a manner that will support the jury verdict.
State v. Schoenfeld, Utah, 545 P.2d 193 (1976).

Finally, on

these appeals from criminal convictions, the evidence is to be
viewed "in a light most favorable to the juryfs verdict and will
reverse only when the evidence is so unsubstantial that a
reasonable person could not have reached the verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt."

State v. Haro, 703 P.2d 301 (Utah 1985),

(citing State v. Brooks, Utah, 638 P.2d 537 (1981), and State v.
Howell, Utah 649 P.2d 91 (1982)).
It is obvious from the record that the evidence supporting
the City's contention was substantial and gave the jury a solid
foundation on which to base the verdict.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the case law set forth herein, it is clear that
the results in case at bar are in line with the previous rulings
announced by the State Supreme Court.

The defendant's arrest was

proper and in accordance with §41-6-44(8) U.C.A. (1953); and the
elements of the offense were well proven by substantial and
generally uncontested evidence.

It is clear that the verdict

herein must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, Layton City respectfully prays this Court
uphold the findings of the jury, the trial court, and the
district court and affirm the finding of guilt.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of December, 1986.

STEVEN L GARSIDE
Attorney for Respondent
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§41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug
or with high blood alcohol content — Criminal
punishment — Arrest without warrant — Suspension or revocation of license.
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any
person with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight, or who is
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of
safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state. The fact that a person charged with violating this section
is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does not constitute a
defense against any charge of violating this section.
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; imprisonment shall
be for not fewer than 60 days. But if the person has inflicted a bodily
injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, any
imprisonment in the county jail shall be for not more than one year.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence is
that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care
which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under
like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to the penalties provided in subsection (3), the court shall,
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving in
the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours
and, in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service
work program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in
addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more
than 720 hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail,
or require the person to work in a community-service work program for
not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the
jail sentence or the work in the community-service work program,
order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series
at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.

Note:

§41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code, is identical to

(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second
conviction under this section or under a losci ordinance similar to this
section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court
shall, in addition to the penalties proVided for in Subsection (3), impose
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160
hours with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require
the person to work in a community-service work project for not less
than 240 nor more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence
or work in the community-service work program, order the person to
obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this
section or a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1) may not be terminated and the department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a
result of the conviction, if it is a second or subsequent conviction within
five years, until the convicted person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, have been
paid.
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing court to order a convicted person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility, obtain, in the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of § 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under
Subsection (7), so as to require the court to render the same order
regarding education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility,
or both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
under § 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7),
as he would render in connection with applying respectively, the first,
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44
(4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under
§ 41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is
a first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction under either § 41-6-44 or 41-6-45 is deemed a prior
conviction. Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any communitybased or other education program provided for in this section shall be
approved by the Department of Social Services.
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of § 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted pursuant
to Subsection 41-6-43 (b) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state
for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not
there had been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the offense. The statement
shall be an offer of proof of the facts which shows whether or not there
was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant, in connection with the offense.

(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of
§ 41-6-45 as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty
or no contest to a charge of violating § 41-6-45, and the prosecutor
states for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or
a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense,
the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection
(5).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of
§ 41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1),
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person otherwise convicted
under this section, except that the department may subtract from any suspension period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended under § 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.

§42-6-44,10 (8), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended
If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a
chemical test or tests under the provisions of this section,
evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil or
criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to
have been committed while the person was driving or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol
and any drug.

Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402.

Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible;
Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible.

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403.

Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Rule 612. Writing Used to Refresh Memory.
If a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the
purpose of testifying, either
1. while testifying, or
2. before testifying, if the court in its discretion
determines it is necessary in the interest of
justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced
at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the
witness. If it is claimed that the writing contains
matters not related to the subject matter of the
testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera,
exercise any portions not so related, and order delivery
of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any
portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and
made available to the appellate court in the event of an
appeal. If a writing is not produced or delivered
pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make
any order justice requires, except that in criminal cases
when the prosecution elects not to comply, the order
shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in
its discretion determines that the interests of justice
so require, declaring a mistrial.

Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is
limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
Rule 702.

Testimony by Experts.

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise.
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